Fingerprinting schemes are technical means to discourage people from illegally redistributing the digital data they have legally purchased. These schemes enable the original merchant to identify the original buyer of the digital data. In so-called asymmetric fingerprinting schemes the fingerprinted data item is only known to the buyer after a sale and if the merchant finds an illegally redistributed copy, he obtains a proof convincing a third party whom this copy belonged to. All these fingerprinting schemes require the buyers to identify themselves just for the purpose of fingerprinting and thus offer the buyers no privacy. Hence anonymous asymmetric fingerprinting schemes were introduced, which preserve the anonymity of the buyers as long as they do not redistribute the data item.
Introduction
Fingerprinting schemes are cryptographic techniques supporting the copyright protection of digital data. They do not require tamper-resistant hardware, i.e., they do not belong to the class of copyright protection methods which prevent copying. It is rather assumed that buyers obtain data in digital form and can copy them. Buyers who redistribute copies disregarding the copyright conditions are called traitors. Fingerprinting schemes discourage traitors by enabling the original merchant to identify a traitor who originally purchased the data item. Every sold copy is slightly different from the original data item and unique to its buyer. Obviously the differences to the original represent the information embedded in the data item, which must be imperceptible. As several traitors might collude and compare their copies to find and eliminate the differences, cryptographic methods were used to make fingerprinting schemes collusion tolerant. There are different classes of fingerprinting schemes called symmetric [BMP86, BS95] and asymmetric [PS96, PW97a, BM97] . In contrast to symmetric schemes, asymmetric schemes require the data item to be fingerprinted via an interactive protocol between the buyer and the merchant where the buyer also inputs her own secret. At the end of this protocol only the buyer knows the fingerprinted data item. However, after finding a redistributed copy the merchant can extract information which not only enables him to identify a traitor but also provides him with a proof of treachery that convinces any third party. The main construction in [PS96] was based on general primitives; an explicit construction, i.e., without such primitives, was only given for the case without significant collusions. Explicit collusion-tolerant constructions were given in [PW97a, BM97] . A special variant of fingerprinting is traitor tracing [CFN94, NP98] ; here the keys for broadcast encryption [FN94] are fingerprinted. Asymmetric traitor tracing was introduced in [Pfi96] with a construction based on general primitives. Explicit constructions for this case were also given in [PW97a] . Even more efficient construction were given in [KD98] ; however, they are not asymmetric in the usual sense but "arbitrated", i.e., a certain number of predefined arbiters can be convinced by the merchant (similar to the difference between arbitrated authentication codes and asymmetric signature schemes).
As in "real-life" market places, it is desired that electronic market places offer privacy to the customers. It should be possible to buy different articles (pictures, books, etc.) anonymously, since buying items can reveal a lot of behavioristic information about an individual. To allow this also for buying fingerprinted items, anonymous asymmetric fingerprinting schemes were proposed [PW97b] . Note that in normal fingerprinting (symmetric and asymmetric) the buyer has to identify herself during each purchase. In anonymous fingerprinting the anonymity of the buyers is preserved as long as they do not redistribute copies of the data item.
In this paper, we introduce a new anonymous asymmetric fingerprinting scheme based on the principles of digital coins. Our protocols are explicit, in contrast to the scheme in [PW97b] , where general theorems like "every NP-language has a zero-knowledge proof system" were used, and thus far more efficient.
The Model of Anonymous Fingerprinting
The involved parties in the model are merchants M, buyers B, registration centers RC and arbiters A. For the purpose of fingerprinting it is required in this model that buyers register themselves to a registration center RC (e.g., their bank). The required trust in RC should be minimum such that a cheating RC can only refuse a registration. 1 It is assumed that B can generate signatures (using an arbitrary signature scheme) under her "real" identity ID B and that the corresponding public keys have already been distributed. Furthermore there is no special restriction on the arbiter A. Any third party having access to the corresponding public keys should be convinced by the proof. The main subprotocols of the construction are registration, fingerprinting, identification, and trial. Identification includes a variant "enforced identification" for the case where RC refuses to cooperate. The main security properties are: Security for the merchant: As long as collusions do not exceed a certain size, the merchant will be able to identify a traitor for each illegally redistributed item and to convince any honest arbiter. (In case RC colludes with the traitors the identified traitor may be RC.) Security for the buyer and RC: Nobody is unduly identified as a traitor; at least no honest arbiter will believe it. Anonymity as sketched above; different purchases by one buyer should also be unlinkable.
For the detailed definitions of the subprotocols and security properties we refer the interested reader to [PW97b] .
Overview of the Construction
To see more precisely what we achieve, note that [PW97b] contains a modular construction: The first part, called framework, is a construction based on certificates. At the end, the merchant holds a commitment com to a certain value emb and possibly other information. The buyer can open the commitment and may also hold other information. This framework guarantees that whenever the merchant later obtains emb, he can identify this buyer and win a trial against him. In the second part, the value emb is embedded into the data item in a way that does not release additional information about emb. The embedding procedure must guarantee that whenever a collusion of at most the maximum tolerated size redistributes a data item, the merchant will be able to reconstruct the value emb that was used by at least one traitor. For the second part, constructions were previously only known for the case of traitor tracing and for normal fingerprinting without collusion tolerance. The latter is explicit, and one can see quite easily that the former (based on [PW97a] Section 4) can also be made explicit by using the efficient key selection protocol from Section 2.3 of the same paper in the appropriate places. The main technical part in [PW97b] was to construct a suitable collusion-tolerant embedding procedure for normal fingerprinting.
In contrast, the framework part in [PW97b] is a comparatively simple construction where emb, the content of the commitment, is a signature with respect to a key that the merchant must not know, and the buyer proves with a general zero-knowledge technique that she knows such a key and a certificate by RC on it. It is this first part that we replace with the explicit and much more efficient coin-based construction. It can then be combined with the known second parts. This gives us explicit overall constructions for collusion-tolerant anonymous traitor tracing and for anonymous normal fingerprinting without collusion tolerance. For collusion-tolerant normal fingerprinting, the construction in [PW97b] is not explicit, but it is mentioned that all the steps in a secure 2-party computation look quite simple so that it should be possible to find simpler explicit realizations for them. We have verified that this is in fact so (each time exploiting either homomorphism -note that even the Reed-Solomon codes are a linear operation -or the efficient table-lookup from [PW97b] , end of Section 2.3), but we are not attempting to include details of that here.
The basic idea for using digital cash systems with double-spender identification to construct an anonymous fingerprinting scheme is as follows: Registration will correspond to withdrawing a coin. (The "coins" serve only as a cryptographic primitive and have no monetary value.) The untraceability of the cash system will give us the unlinkability of the views of the registration center and the merchant. Redistribution of a data item should correspond to double-spending of the underlying coin, i.e., the value emb embedded in the data item will be similar to the response in a second payment with the coin. We could execute a complete first payment during fingerprinting, but actually our protocols can be simpler. (It is more like a "zero-spendable" coin where the coin as such can be shown but any response to a challenge leads to identification.) One new problem is that while in a payment the response is given to the merchant in clear, in our case it must be verifiably hidden in a commitment. Another problem is that double-spender identification is usually a binary decision. In our case, however, it must be decided reliably under what copyright conditions the redistributed item was bought -e.g., there may be items that can be redistributed after a while. In the formal security requirements this is a value text input in fingerprinting and also in a trial. Thus the identification information must be linked to such a text during fingerprinting in a way that even a collusion of a merchant and the registration center cannot forge, although such a collusion can sign additional coins that look like belonging to a specific buyer.
Construction
Our explicit construction employs the ideas from the digital cash scheme in [Bra94] , or, as we do not have the same double-spender identification, at least from the underlying blind signature scheme [CP93] . We make the following conventions:
Algebraic Structure: All arithmetic operations are performed in a group G q of order q for which efficient algorithms are known to multiply, invert, determine equality of elements, test membership and randomly select elements. Any group G q satisfying these requirements and in which the computation of discrete logarithms is infeasible can be a candidate. For concrete constructions one can assume that G q is the unique subgroup of prime order q of the multiplicative group Z p where p is a prime such that qj(p ? 1).
Hash Function: Hash functions are denoted by hash. We have to make the same assumptions as in [Bra94] , which is behavior similar to a random oracle.
Commitment Scheme: We use two commitment schemes. The first one is based on discrete logarithms in G q (see [BKK90] for the one-bit version and [CHP92, Ped92] based on [BCP88] for the general version).
To commit to a value b 2 Z q , the committer requires randomly selected generators g 00 ; h 00 2 R G q n f1g, typically sent by the recipient. Then the committer selects x 2 R Z q and computes the commitment y = BC DL (x; b) = g 00 b h 00 x mod p. To open y, the committer reveals (b; x). This scheme is informationtheoretically hiding and it is binding under the discrete logarithm assumption in the corresponding group.
Moreover due to the homomorphic property of this scheme one can commit to a number r 2 Z q using commitments to the bits of r: Let r = P l?1 j=0 r j 2 j be the binary representation of r and BC DL (x j ; r j ) be commitments to the bits. Then Q l?1 j=0 (BC DL (x j ; r j )) 2 j = g 00 r h 00 x = BC DL (x; r) mod p with x = P l?1 j=0 x j 2 j .
The second bit commitment scheme is based on quadratic residues. To commit to a bit b 0 the committer computes y = BC QR (x 0 ; b 0 ) = (?1) b 0 x 0 2 mod n where x 0 2 R Z n and n is a Blum integer chosen by the committer.
Key Distribution and Registration
Registration Center Key Distribution: RC randomly selects a group G q and generators g, g 1 , g 2 2 R G q n f1g and a number x 2 R Z q as its secret key. RC also chooses a hash function hash. It publishes the group description, (g; g 1 ; g 2 ), its public key h g x mod p and hash.
The correctness of the group description (i.e., that p and q primes with qj(p ? 1) and generated in a way believed to exclude trap doors) and whether the generators are elements of G q n f1g should be verified by other parties when using them. However, other parties do not rely on the randomness of the generators.
Opening a one-time account:
This phase is similar to [Bra94] , but in order to bind the identification information to a specific purchase text, each "account" is used only once. To open an account, B chooses i 2 R Z q randomly and secretly and computes h 1 g i mod p (with h 1 g 2 6 = 1). She gives h 1 to RC and proves that she knows i (using the zero-knowledge proof from [CEG88] or, more efficiently, Schnorr identification [Sch91] ). First RC verifies that the account number h 1 has not been used before. Then it stores h 1 in its registration database together with the claimed normal identity ID B of this buyer. B gives a signature sig coin on h 1 under her normal identity ID B and RC verifies it. This signature can be used in later trials to show that B is responsible for this "account number" h 1 . Withdrawal: The protocol is shown in Figure 1 . Essentially, RC signs the common input m h 1 g 2 g i 1 g 2 mod p using a restrictive blind signature as in [Bra94] . Thus B obtains a signature 0 = (z 0 ; a 0 ; b 0 ; r 0 ) on m 0 m s g is 1 g s 2 mod p where s 2 R Z q is chosen randomly and secretly by B.
Our protocol is also similar to the withdrawal protocol in [Bra94] in that an additional value is included in the hashing to obtain the challenge c 0 and thus in the signing process. In our case it is the public key of the key pair (sk text ; pk text ) from an arbitrary signature scheme, here Schnorr's for concreteness [Sch91] . We call the triple (m 0 ; pk text ; 0 ) a coin. 
Fingerprinting
The fingerprinting subprotocol is executed between the (anonymous) buyer B and the merchant M. This protocol differs (except for Step 1) from the payment protocol in [Bra94] . The common input is a text, text, describing the purchase item and licensing conditions.
Step 1 . We say that a coin is valid if and only if it passes these tests. He then verifies sig text using pk text from coin 0 .
Step 2: B takes the internal structure (is; s) of m 0 g is 1 g s 2 as the value to be embedded in the data item.
Hence emb = (is; s), and let r 1 = is, r 2 = s.
Since M should not get any useful information on this value, B hides it in a commitment. While the certificate-based framework in [PW97b] This can be done in zero-knowledge as shown in Figure 2 , similar to other proofs concerning knowledge of representations of numbers with respect to certain generators following [CEG88] . As usual, we could also use larger challenges c at the cost of the real zero-knowledge property.
Note that this protocol does not prove that the values r ij are binary; such a proof will be a side effect of
Step 3. Step 2 of the Fingerprinting Protocol
Step 3: Now B additionally computes quadratic residue commitments on the same values r ij . As mentioned, these are needed as input to the embedding procedures. We denote them by com 0 ij = BC QR (x 0 ij ; r ij ) for x 0 ij 2 R Z n , where n is a Blum integer chosen by the buyer. B sends these commitments to M and proves in zero-knowledge that the contents in each pair (com ij ; com 0 ij ) are equal. Since one can only commit to bits when using BC QR , the equality proof implies that the values r ij in Step 2 were binary. An efficient proof can again be carried out by fairly standard techniques. For instance, one can see two pairs of commitments BC DL and BC QR , where both commitments in one pair contain "0" and in the other pair "1", as a cryptographic capsule and proceed similar to [Ben87] . This is a proof with one-bit challenges and thus the least efficient part of our protocol. However, even if one only compares it with the simplest embedding procedure that might follow, fingerprinting without collusion tolerance as in [PS96] , one sees that quadratic residue commitments must be made on a portion of the data item significantly larger than the word emb to be embedded into it (so that the resulting changes are small). Thus the complexity of our last step is not larger than that of embedding.
Identification
After finding a redistributed copy of the data item, M tries to identify a traitor as follows:
Step 1: M extracts a value emb = (r 1 ; r 2 ) from the redistributed data item using the extraction algorithm from the underlying embedding scheme. This pair is (is; s) with s 6 = 0. M computes m 0 g is 1 g s 2 mod p and retrieves coin 0 , text, and sig text from the purchase record of the corresponding data item. If he does not find the coin identifier m 0 , he gives up (the collusion tolerance of the underlying code may be exceeded).
Otherwise he sends i to RC.
Step 2: RC searches in its registration database for a buyer who is registered under the value h 1 g i 1 . It retrieves the values (ID B ; sig coin ) and sends them to M. Note that M can enforce RC's cooperation, see below.
Step 3: M verifies the signature sig coin on h 1 .
Enforced Identification
This is a special case in identification if RC refuses to reveal the information requested by M:
Step 1: M sends proof 1 = (coin 0 ; (i; s)) to an arbiter A.
Step 2: A verifies the validity of coin 0 using the algorithm from Step 1 of fingerprinting and that m 0 g is 1 g s 2 mod p. If it is wrong, A rejects M's claim. Otherwise she sends i to RC requiring the values (ID B ; sig coin ). Then A verifies them as M does in Step 3 of the identification.
Trial
Now M tries to convince an arbiter A that B redistributed the data item bought under conditions described in text. The values ID B and text are common inputs.
Step 1: M sends to A the proof string proof = ((i; sig coin ); (coin 0 ; sig text ); s):
Step 2: A computes h 1 g i 1 mod p and verifies that sig coin is a valid signature on h 1 with respect to ID B .
If yes, it means that i, the internal structure of an account number h 1 for which B was responsible, has been recovered by M and thus, as we will see, that B has redistributed some data item. Note that i alone is not enough evidence for A to find B guilty of redistributing a data item under the specific text, text.
Step 3: A verifies the validity of coin 0 and the signature sig text on the disputed text using the test key pk text contained in coin 0 . These verifications imply that if the accused buyer owned this coin, she must have spent it in the disputed purchase on text. Now A must verify that this coin belongs to B. It is not possible to do so by only showing the link between the coin and the withdrawal (which could be fixed by a signature from B under RC's view), because a collusion of M and RC could forge such a link. (Interested readers can find the attack in Appendix A.) Thus A performs the following last step where B is required to take part.
Step 4: A asks B whether she has withdrawn another valid coin, i.e., a tuple coin = (m 0 ; pk text ; 0 ) using the one-time account h 1 . If yes, B has to show the representation of m 0 , i.e., a value s such that m 0 g is 1 g s 2 . If B can do that, then A decides that RC is guilty, otherwise B.
Security of the Construction
We now present detailed proof sketches of our construction. We assume that all the underlying primitives are secure.
Security for the Merchant
Due to the properties of the underlying embedding scheme, we can assume that whenever the maximum tolerated size of a collusion is not exceeded, and the collusion redistributes a data item sufficiently similar to the original, then M can extract a value emb that belongs to a traitor with very high probability. More precisely emb is the value to which the traitor could open the final quadratic-residue commitments given in the corresponding purchase. M is also protected from making wrong accusations (and thus possibly damaging his reputation): Even if there are more than the tolerated number of traitors, M's verifications in identification guarantee that whenever he makes an accusation he will not lose in the trial.
Security for the Buyer
Consider an honest buyer B and a trial about the purchase on a specific text, text, for which B has not revealed the corresponding data item. She is secure if the attackers cannot convince an honest arbiter A in this trial, even if the other parties collude and obtain other data items that she bought (active attack). Such situations occur, e.g., if B is allowed to redistribute another item after a certain period of time.
Step 2 of the trial guarantees that B is only held responsible for one of her own one-time account numbers h 1 g i 1 , and that the attackers must know i.
First it is shown that the attackers cannot find i unless they obtain the result of a purchase where B has used a coin coin withdrawn from the account h 1 . The only knowledge the attackers can otherwise obtain about i in our protocol is: (1) h 1 itself, (2) the proof of knowledge of i in registration, and (3) the commitments on emb = (is; s) and two zero-knowledge proofs in fingerprinting. Additionally, they might obtain information in embedding, but by definition of secure embedding this is not the case. If the proofs are actually zero-knowledge and the commitments semantically secure, computing i from all this information is as hard as computing it from h 1 alone, i.e., as computing a discrete logarithm (If we use Schnorr identification and a similar proof in fingerprinting, security relies on the security of these identification protocols against retrieval of the secret key).
Hence the only way for the attackers to find i is in fact to obtain the resulting data item in a purchase where B has used coin based on h 1 . Let text be the text describing that purchase. By the precondition, we know that text 6 = text. The secret key sk text corresponding to pk text in coin is known only to B, and B reveals no information about it during registration, fingerprinting, and redistribution except making one signature on text with it. As we assume that the underlying signature scheme is secure against active attacks, this does not help the attackers to forge a valid signature with respect to pk text on text. 
Security for the Registration Center
An honest RC should never be found guilty in a trial with an honest A. RC could be found guilty in two cases: (1) In the enforced identification if M can convince A but RC cannot reveal the required data and (2) if the attackers (a collusion of M and B) can generate two coins, coin 0 and coin , whose representations correspond to the same h 1 . However both cases cannot occur due to the restrictiveness of the blind signature scheme (Assumption 1 in [Bra94] ):
In the first case, the attackers need a valid coin coin 0 = (m 0 ; pk text ; 0 ) and values i; s with m 0 = g is 1 g s 2 such that no withdrawal with respect to h 1 = g i 1 was performed. However, if the attackers have a valid coin and know its representation, then this representation must be a multiple of the original representation, which can only be (i; 1).
In the second case, since RC ensures that each account is only used once, the attackers would have to withdraw one of the coins from another account. Then its representation would be a multiple of another pair (i ; 1).
Anonymity
Due to the properties of the underlying cash system the views of RC and M concerning the withdrawal of a coin and its verification are unlinkable. Obviously, sig coin in registration and sig text in fingerprinting are no problem because they are not used in the other protocol. Furthermore using one-time accounts implies that B's different purchases are unlinkable, even if a purchased data item has been redistributed and the information contained in it recovered.
In fingerprinting the value emb, which could be used for linking, is hidden in bit commitments. The first used commitment scheme, based on discrete logarithm, is information-theoretically hiding and the second one, based on quadratic residues, is hiding under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. Moreover the zeroknowledge protocols used in fingerprinting do not leak information about emb and the embedding operation is assumed not to leak such information either.
A Linking a Self-Made Coin to a Correct Withdrawal
In this appendix, we show the attack that motivates the last verification step in the trial, as mentioned in Assume now that the attackers are a collusion of M and RC and have access to the data item that B has bought in this purchase. Then they know emb = (is; s), w, x, view withdraw = (a; b; c), r, and the signature sig coin on view withdraw .
As sig coin fixes the values (a; b; c) that can be used together with the given h 1 , the attackers want to link a self-made coin coin 0 A , in particular with a self-made pk A text for which the attackers know sk A Finally, the attackers can use sk A text to sign any text they like with respect to this coin.
